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Abstract 
The current study investigated whether people can simultaneously acquire 
knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures in implicit sequence 
learning; and whether the degree of abstraction determines the conscious status of the 
acquired knowledge. We adopted three types of stimuli in a serial reaction time task in 
three experiments. The RT results indicated that people could simultaneously acquire 
knowledge about concrete chunks and abstract structures of the temporal sequence. 
Generation performance revealed that ability to control was mainly based on abstract 
structures rather than concrete chunks. Moreover, ability to control was not generally 
accompanied with awareness of knowing or knowledge, as measured by confidence 
ratings and attribution tests, confirming that people could control the use of 
unconscious knowledge of abstract structures. The results present a challenge to 
computational models and theories of implicit learning. 
Key words: implicit learning, sequence learning, concrete chunks, abstract 
structures   
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 1 
Introduction 2 
 3 
Although implicit learning has been defined as the acquisition of unconscious 4 
complex knowledge (Jiménez, 2003; Reber, 1989; Seger, 1994), it remains 5 
controversial whether people acquire knowledge about concrete exemplars (i.e., 6 
chunks or fragments) or abstract structures (i.e., other rules or regularities) in implicit 7 
learning (e.g., Dominey, Lelekov, Ventre-Dominey, & Jeannerod, 1998; Goschke & 8 
Bolte, 2007). The abstraction of general rules from direct experiences allows for the 9 
flexibility and adaptability that are central to intelligent behavior (Wallis, Anderson, & 10 
Miller, 2001). The degree of abstraction that can be implicitly learnt has important 11 
consequence for computational models and theories of implicit learning. 12 
Reber (1989), one of the founders of implicit learning research, argued that 13 
implicit learning is characterized by two critical features: It results in knowledge that 14 
is largely (1) unconscious; (2) abstract. The initial empirical evidence in support of 15 
this assumption stemmed primarily from transfer effects in artificial grammar learning. 16 
For example, in an artificial grammar learning (AGL) task, participants are exposed to 17 
a set of letter strings that are generated by a finite-state grammar in the training phase; 18 
when participants are presented with novel letter strings or novel tone sequences in 19 
the test phase, they can implicitly transfer or apply the grammatical knowledge to test 20 
sequences constructed out of the same or indeed a new vocabulary (e.g., Altmann, 21 
Dienes, & Goode, 1995; see Reber, 1989 for a review). Despite abundant evidence for 22 
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people acquiring structural knowledge of artificial grammars, the interpretation of the 23 
learning as implicit or abstract has been questioned widely over the last twenty years 24 
(e.g., Dulany, 1997; Perruchet & Vinter, 2002; Shanks, 2004). For example, Perruchet 25 
and Pacteau (1990) demonstrated that classifying new letter strings as grammatical or 26 
ungrammatical may depend on fragmentary knowledge of the bigrams of the training 27 
letter strings rather than an unconscious abstract representation of the grammar. 28 
Gomez (1997) argued that simple learning, such as learning first-order dependencies 29 
(bigrams), could occur without awareness, but more complex learning, such as 30 
learning second-order dependencies, was linked to explicit knowledge. The debate 31 
regarding what is learned implicitly is far from resolved (contrast Dienes, 2012; 32 
Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2016). 33 
Many recent studies in implicit sequence learning have focused on whether 34 
people can implicitly acquire complex knowledge such as second-order conditional 35 
(SOC) structure, by adopting SOC sequences in a serial reaction time (SRT) task (e.g., 36 
Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2001, 2003; Fu, Fu, & Dienes, 2008; Norman, Price, & 37 
Duff, 2006; Norman, Price, Duff, & Mentzoni, 2007; Pronk & Visser, 2010; 38 
Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). In the SRT task, participants are asked to respond to the 39 
target at one of four locations as accurately and as quickly as possible. Unbeknownst 40 
to participants, the stimuli may follow, for example, a SOC sequence. It has been 41 
demonstrated that people can implicitly acquire sequence knowledge about the SOC 42 
structure when the response-stimulus interval (RSI) is zero (Destrebecqz & 43 
Cleeremans, 2001; Fu, Fu, & Dienes, 2008; see Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004 for 44 
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inconsistent findings). These findings provided important evidence that people can 45 
unconsciously acquire complex knowledge such as second-order dependencies. 46 
Nonetheless, in the SRT task, the learning effect is mainly defined as shorter reaction 47 
times for the training sequence compared to the transfer or random sequence, which 48 
depends only on people acquiring concrete chunks or triplets of the training sequence 49 
rather than abstract structures. By contrast, in the AGL task, there is evidence of 50 
learning not only chunks or associations, but also relations that go beyond chunks or 51 
associations, namely patterns of repetitions independent of vocabulary (e.g. Brooks & 52 
Vokey, 1991; Tunney & Altmann, 2001) or symmetries (e.g. Ling, Li, Qiao, Guo & 53 
Dienes, 2016) or other supra-finite state structures (e.g., Rohrmeier, Fu, & Dienes, 54 
2012). 55 
To address whether people can acquire structure more abstract than memorized 56 
chunks in implicit sequence learning, Goschke and Bolte (2007) developed a new 57 
serial naming task (SNT), in which participants were asked to name line-drawings of 58 
concrete objects from one of four semantic categories. Unbeknownst to participants, 59 
the concrete objects were presented in a random order, but the sequence of semantic 60 
categories followed a repeating sequence (e.g., furniture–body part–animal– 61 
clothing–body part–animal). They found that the reaction times in the SNT were 62 
much faster for a repeating category sequence than a random category sequence but 63 
performance in a sequence reproduction task was not significantly greater than chance 64 
level, which was taken to indicate that people implicitly acquired knowledge about 65 
the repeating category sequence. As the acquired knowledge referred to sequential 66 
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dependencies between semantic categories rather than specific exemplars, it was 67 
abstract in this sense (Compare Rebuschat & Williams, 2009, finding implicit learning 68 
of the order of grammatical type of word independent of the exact words used in an 69 
AGL paradigm). However, Dominey, Lelecov, Ventre-Dominey, & Jeannerod (1998) 70 
investigated learning of abstract repetition structure in the SRT task and found that 71 
participants in the implicit group did not significantly learn the abstract structure. 72 
Nonetheless, in the Experiments 2 and 3 of Dominey et al. (1998), participants in the 73 
implicit learning condition also showed significant or marginally significant learning 74 
effects of the abstract structures, although it was argued that this abstract learning 75 
effect was due to single-item recency effects. Other researchers have also argued that 76 
abstract knowledge can be acquired only in explicit learning conditions (Boyer, 77 
Destrebecqz, & Cleeremans, 2005; Channon et al., 2002; Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, 78 
2005; Johnston & Shanks, 2001).     79 
Fu, Fu, and Dienes (2008) adopted two second-order conditional (SOC) 80 
sequences (SOC1 = 3-4-2-3-1-2-1-4-3-2-4-1; SOC2 = 3-4-1-2-4-3-1-4-2-1-3-2) in the 81 
training phase, in which one SOC sequence is the training sequence and its triplets 82 
occurred with a large probability and the other SOC sequence is the transfer sequence 83 
and its triplets occurred with a small probability. After the training, people were asked 84 
to complete two free generation tests according to the logic of the Process 85 
Dissociation Procedure (PDP, Jacoby, 1991; for bias of the PDP measure see Stahl, 86 
Barth, & Haider, 2015): in an inclusion test, participants were asked to generate a 87 
sequence that was same as the training sequence; in an exclusion test, participants 88 
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were asked to generate a sequence that was different from the training sequence. They 89 
found that two types of knowledge were expressed in the explicit tests: 1) knowledge 90 
relevant to distinguishing training and transfer SOC sequences, i.e., chunking 91 
knowledge about concrete chunks or triplets; 2) knowledge concerning properties 92 
both training and transfer SOC sequences had in common, i.e., abstract structures 93 
about repetition patterns. They also found that the amount of noise and training 94 
influenced the conscious status of chunking knowledge and abstract knowledge in a 95 
different way, indicating that people can simultaneously acquire chunking and abstract 96 
knowledge in implicit sequence learning. 97 
The abstract feature shared by training and transfer SOC sequences in Fu et al. 98 
(2008) is reversal frequency (Pronk & Visser, 2010). A reversal refers to a triplet in 99 
which the first and the third stimulus were the same, as found in ABA grammars 100 
(Marcus, 1999) or n-2 repetition (Koch, Philipp, & Gade, 2006). Reed and Johnson 101 
(1994) considered reversals as salient, and each of the SOC sequence (SOC1 = 102 
3-4-2-3-1-2-1-4-3-2-4-1; SOC2 = 3-4-1-2-4-3-1-4-2-1-3-2) has only one reversal. 103 
That is, there is one reversal triplet in the training or transfer SOC sequence, while 104 
there are ten reversal triplets in the neither SOC sequence. To investigate the effects of 105 
reversal frequencies in probabilistic SOC sequence learning, Pronk and Visser (2010) 106 
trained one group of participants with the sequence that contained only a single 107 
reversal and one group of participants with the sequence that contained four reversals. 108 
They found that the reversal frequency in probabilistic SOC sequence learning 109 
influenced how people responded to reversals and non-reversals in the SRT task and 110 
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which type of knowledge became explicit in the explicit test. Tanaka and Watanabe 111 
(2013, 2014) also showed that after learning a set of triplets in an SRT task, 112 
participants were particularly fast to the triplets with the elements in reverse order 113 
compared to other re-orderings, even in participants who claimed not to notice the 114 
pattern. 115 
Interestingly, both simulation and experimental work indicate that rule learning 116 
in implicit learning is at least largely associatively-driven and extracting the statistical 117 
regularities in the sequence play a crucial role (e.g. Cleeremans & Dienes, 2008; 118 
Speiegel & McLaren, 2006). Few studies have investigated abstract learning in the 119 
SRT task because it is difficult to distinguish rule learning from associative learning.  120 
To address this issue, we adopted three types of stimuli that differed in only the 121 
sequence location to detect the effects of associative learning and rule learning 122 
separately in the training phase in the present study. “Standard” stimuli refer to the 123 
stimuli that followed the training SOC sequence, and appeared with a high probability. 124 
“Transfer” stimuli refer to the stimuli that followed the transfer SOC sequence, but 125 
appeared with a low probability. “Deviant” stimuli refer to the stimuli that followed 126 
neither SOC sequence and appeared with a low probability, like “transfer” stimuli. 127 
That is, “standard” and “transfer” had similar abstract structure about repetition 128 
patterns but differed in the probability of occurrence, while “transfer” and “deviant” 129 
both appeared with a similar low probability but differed in the abstract structure. If 130 
people acquired only chunking knowledge about the probability of occurrence for 131 
each type of stimuli through associative learning, there would be no difference on RTs 132 
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between “deviant” and “transfer” stimuli as their probabilities were similarly low. 133 
Otherwise, if people simultaneously acquire knowledge about chunks or triplets and 134 
abstract structures, they would respond faster for “standard” than “transfer” and faster 135 
for “transfer” than “deviant”.  136 
Further, to measure the explicit status of the acquired knowledge, we adopted 137 
two methods: the process dissociation procedure (PDP), which measures the ability to 138 
control the use of the knowledge (Jacoby, 1991; for bias of the PDP measure see Stahl, 139 
Barth, & Haider, 2015); and subjective measures, which measure awareness of 140 
knowing (Dienes, 2012). The difference between inclusion and exclusion performance 141 
reflects the ability to control the use of the acquired knowledge (Jacoby, 1991; 142 
Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004). Chunking knowledge was measured by the difference in 143 
probability of occurrence between “standard” and “transfer” triplets; thus, control of 144 
chunking knowledge was measured as the difference in generation performance 145 
between the inclusion and exclusion test for “standard” and “transfer” triplets. 146 
Abstract knowledge was measured by the difference in abstract structure between 147 
“transfer” and “deviant”; and control of abstract knowledge was measured as the 148 
difference in generation performance between the inclusion and exclusion test for 149 
“transfer” and “deviant” triplets. Further, confidence ratings were taken for generation 150 
performance to measure awareness of knowing. Awareness of knowing often goes 151 
together with ability to control the knowledge, but awareness of knowledge and 152 
control of that knowledge can dissociate (Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010; Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 153 
2008); thus, both types of measures were used for a nuanced assessment of the 154 
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explicit nature of the acquired knowledge. For example, if one consciously knew that 155 
an item was legal one could include or exclude it as instructed, thereby exerting 156 
control; but one need not consciously know why it is legal. Thus in Experiment 3 we 157 
will specifically measure the conscious status of both the judgment that a triplet is 158 
legal as well as the conscious status of the knowledge that enabled that judgment. 159 
Experiment 1 160 
To explore how associative learning dissociated from rule learning, “standard”, 161 
“transfer”, and “deviant” stimuli were adopted in the training phase and the 162 
probabilities of “standard”, “transfer”, and “deviant” triplets were set as .883, .083, 163 
and .083, respectively in Experiment 1. As three types of stimuli may make the 164 
sequence learning difficult, all participants were trained with a relatively long training 165 
phase.  166 
Method 167 
Participants 168 
Twenty-five undergraduate students (13 male, 12 female) took part in this 169 
experiment. None of them had previously taken part in any implicit learning 170 
experiment. They were paid for their attendance. This experiment was approved by 171 
the committee for the protection of subjects at the Institute of Psychology, Chinese 172 
Academy of Sciences, and so were Experiments 2 and 3.  173 
Apparatus and Materials  174 
The experiment was programmed in E-prime 1.2 and run on 175 
Pentium-compatible PCs. The display consisted of a red, yellow, blue, or green square 176 
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in the centre of the computer’s screen against a silver gray background. The red, 177 
yellow, blue, and green colour squares corresponded to numerals 1, 2, 3, and 4 in the 178 
two SOCs (SOC1 = 3-4-2-3-1-2-1-4-3-2-4-1; SOC2 = 3-4-1-2-4-3-1-4-2-1-3-2) that 179 
were presented in a circular fashion (see Reed & Johnson, 1994). Each SOC sequence 180 
can be broken down into 12 sequential chunks of three colours, or triplets. For 181 
example, SOC1 can be broken down into the triplets 3-4-2, 4-2-3, 2-3-1, and so on; 182 
and SOC2 can be broken down into the triplets 3-4-1, 4-1-2, 1-2-4, and so on. To 183 
generate the probabilistic sequences, the stimuli were followed by the triplets from a 184 
training SOC sequence (i.e., “standard” stimuli) with a high probability of .833, 185 
followed by the triplets from the other SOC sequence (i.e., “transfer” stimuli) with a 186 
low probabilities of .083, and followed by the triplets from neither SOC sequence (i.e., 187 
“deviant” stimuli) with a low probabilities of .083 in each block. Figure 1 shows the 188 
exemplars of the probabilistic sequences in the training phase. 189 
 190 
 ----------- Insert Figure 1 about here -----------  191 
 192 
Procedure 193 
Training phase. Participants were asked to complete a serial four-choice reaction 194 
time task. On each trial, a colour square appeared in the center of the screen and 195 
covered visual angle of approximately 1°. Participants were instructed to respond as 196 
quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing a corresponding key on the 197 
keyboard. Keys D, F, J, and K corresponded to red, yellow, blue, and green colour 198 
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squares. Participants were required to respond to Keys D and F with the middle and 199 
index fingers of their left hand, and to respond to Keys J and K with the index and 200 
middle fingers of their right hand. The target was removed as soon as a correct key 201 
had been pressed, and the next stimulus appeared after 500 ms, i.e. the response 202 
stimulus interval is 500 ms. Response latencies were measured from the onset of the 203 
target to the completion of a correct response and errors were recorded (see Figure 2). 204 
If an incorrect key was pressed, the stimulus would appear again until the correct key 205 
was pressed. Unbeknownst to participants, the colour squares followed a probabilistic 206 
sequence that consisted of 146 trials in each block. Thirty-second rest breaks occurred 207 
between any two experimental blocks. There were 20 training blocks, for a total of 208 
2920 trials. For counter balancing purposes, half of the participants in each condition 209 
were trained on SOC1 and half on SOC2.  210 
Test phase. The test phase included two trial-by-trial generation tests: an 211 
inclusion test and an exclusion test. At the beginning of each test, all participants were 212 
informed that the colour squares had followed a regular sequence, in which most 213 
colour squares were determined by the previous two. On each test trial, participants 214 
were first instructed to respond to a short sequence of two movements as in the 215 
training. Then, a black square appeared and they were required to generate next colour 216 
square by pressing a corresponding key. In the inclusion test, they were required to 217 
generate the colour square that appeared most frequently after the previous two in the 218 
training; and in the exclusion test, they were required to generate the colour square 219 
that appeared seldom after the previous two in the training. The same colour square 220 
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never immediately repeated in training and so the chance level for a correct response 221 
is 1/3 every time for each sequence. After each generation, participants reported the 222 
confidence level of their judgment by inputting one of: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 0 that 223 
corresponded to 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 100%, in which 50% meant 224 
complete guessing and 100% meant certainty. Participants had to take one hand off 225 
the keys every trial to input the number. To reduce the influence of the confidence 226 
judgment on next trial, a screen stating “Are you ready? Please press the space key to 227 
continue” was presented after the confidence judgment. Thus, the next test trial would 228 
appear only when participants were ready. In each test, 12 different test trials were 229 
presented in a random order and repeated 12 times to make a total of 144 test trials.  230 
Inferential strategy 231 
For all tests p values are reported; in addition, for all t tests, Bayes factors, B, 232 
are reported. Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence 233 
(Wagenmakers et al., in press). A B of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for the 234 
alternative hypothesis (H1) and below 1/3 substantial evidence for the null hypothesis 235 
(H0); “substantial” in the sense of just worth taking note of. Bs between 3 and 1/3 236 
indicate data insensitivity (see Dienes, 2014; cf Jeffreys, 1939). Thus we will report 237 
that there was no effect only when B < 1/3. Here, BN (0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in 238 
which the predictions of H1 were modeled as normal distribution with an SD of x (see 239 
Dienes, 2014), where x scales the size of effect that could be expected.  240 
In Experiment 2 of Fu et al. (2008), RT differences of about 20 ms were found 241 
between probable (i.e., standard) and improbable (i.e., transfer) stimuli. Thus, for RTs, 242 
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we used a half-normal with SD = 20 ms to model H1; for simplicity, we did this for 243 
all tests of RT effects. Similarly, in Experiment 2 of Fu et al. (2008), differences in 244 
error proportions of about .03 were found between standard and transfer. Thus, we 245 
report B N (0, .03) for all contrasts of error proportions. In Experiment 2 of Fu et al. 246 
(2008), in the generation test, differences of around .10 were found. Thus, we report B 247 
N (0, .10) for contrasts involving the generation test. In Experiment 1 of Fu et al. (2010), 248 
an average slope of .89 was found for the I-E difference of standard. Thus, we report 249 
B N (0, .89) for the slope. With these assumptions for modeling H1, as it happened, where 250 
an effect yielded a p value of about .05, the Bayes factor was about 3, though there is 251 
no guarantee of such a correspondence between B and p values (Lindley, 1957). We 252 
will interpret all effects with respect to the Bayes factors. 253 
Results 254 
Training data. Trials with RTs greater than 1,500 milliseconds were dropped. 255 
these amounted to 0.77% of the trials.  256 
 257 
----------- Insert Figure 2 about here ----------- 258 
 259 
Figure 2 shows mean RTs obtained over the training phase in Experiment 1. The 260 
RT advantage of standard over transfer indicates associative learning of chunking 261 
knowledge and the RT advantage of transfer over deviant indicates rule learning of 262 
abstract structure. To examine whether two types of learning can occurs 263 
simultaneously, an ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli (standard vs. transfer vs. 264 
 15 
deviant) and blocks (20 levels) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed a 265 
significant effect of type of stimuli (see Table 1), and participants responded to 266 
standard more quickly than to transfer stimuli, t (24) = 7.74, p < .001, dz = 1.55, B N (0, 267 
20) = 9.18×1010, and responded to transfer more quickly than to deviant stimuli, t (24) 268 
= 10.87, p < .001, dz = 2.17, B N (0, 20) = 2.49×1016. That is, people acquired 269 
knowledge of both chunks and the abstract structure of the sequence. The main effect 270 
of blocks reached significance, and so did the interaction of type of stimuli by block, 271 
indicating that the learning effects were greater later in practice than earlier on.  272 
 273 
----------- Insert Table 1 about here ----------- 274 
 275 
As deviant stimuli included ten reversals that differed from the abstract SOC 276 
structure of standard and transfer which consisted of one reversal, the slower RT 277 
effect for deviant may due to the reversal frequency. To examine this possibility, we 278 
calculated RTs for each type of stimulus when deviant were reversals or non-reversals. 279 
An ANOVA with type of stimulus (standard vs. transfer vs. deviant) and type of 280 
deviant (reversal vs. non-reversal) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed a 281 
significant effect of type of stimulus, an effect of type of deviant, and a significant 282 
type of stimulus by type of deviant interaction (see Table 1). Further analysis revealed 283 
that when deviants were reversals, participants responded more quickly to standard 284 
than to transfer, t (24) = 7.92, p < .001, dz = 1.58, B N (0, 20) = 8.65×1010, more quickly 285 
to transfer than to deviant, t (24) = 16.44, p < .001, dz = 3.29, B N (0, 20) = 2.01×1029; 286 
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but when deviants were non-reversals, they responded more quickly to deviant than to 287 
standard or transfer stimuli, t (24) = 3.45, p < .001, dz = .69, B N (0, 20) = 18.16, t (24) = 288 
5.54, p < .001, dz = 1.11, B N (0, 20) = 7.50×102, respectively. In sum, people responded 289 
to standard more quickly than to transfer and responded to transfer more quickly than 290 
to deviant only when the deviant was a reversal. That is, the slower RTs for deviant 291 
stimuli were due to the reversals. 292 
Overall, the mean error proportions for standard, transfer, and deviant stimuli 293 
were .05 (SD = .03), .09 (SD = .05), .12 (SD = .06). The error proportion for standard 294 
was lower than for transfer stimuli, t (24) = 4.99, p < .001, dz = 1.00, B N (0, .03) = 295 
1.31×104, while the error proportion for transfer were lower than for deviant stimuli, t 296 
(24) = 4.92, p < .001, dz = .98, B N (0, .03) = 3.73×104. The RT effects were not 297 
compromised by speed-error trade-offs. 298 
Testing Phase. Table 2 shows mean proportions for each type of triplet in 299 
Experiment 1. As participants expressed knowledge of concrete triplets and abstract 300 
structure only when deviant were reversals, we analyzed only the generation 301 
performance for deviants being reversals.     302 
 303 
----------- Insert Table 2 about here ----------- 304 
 305 
More standard generated under inclusion than exclusion, i.e., I > E for standard, 306 
was often taken to indicate the acquisition of explicit knowledge. However, if 307 
participants mainly explicitly learned chunking knowledge distinguishing standard 308 
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and transfer triplets, the I-E difference for standard and transfer would be different. To 309 
investigate whether people expressed control over chunking knowledge, an ANOVA 310 
with instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of SOC triplet (standard vs. 311 
transfer) as the within-subject variables was used. It revealed an instruction effect, a 312 
type of SOC triplet effect, and an instruction by type of SOC triplet interaction (see 313 
Table 3). Further analysis revealed that there were more standard than transfer under 314 
inclusion (i.e., I > B), t (24) = 6.20, p < .001, dz = 1.45, B N (0, .10) = 2.48×106, but there 315 
was no differences between standard and transfer under exclusion (i.e., E = B), t (24) 316 
= -1.51, p = .15, B N (0, .10) = .10. Importantly, participants generated more standard 317 
under inclusion than exclusion (i.e., I > E), t (24) = 6.87, p < .001, dz = 1.35, B N (0, .10) 318 
= 5.27×105, and more transfer under inclusion than exclusion (i.e., I > E), t (24) = 319 
1.95, p = .063, dz = .39, B N (0, .10) = 3.90. The I > E for transfer indicated that people 320 
produced more incorrect fragments when attempting to produce the sequence than 321 
withhold it. The qualitatively similar I-E pattern for standard and transfer indicated 322 
that people lacked control over their chunking knowledge in the sense that they 323 
inaccurately represented transfer triplets as high frequency.  324 
 325 
----------- Insert Table 3 about here ----------- 326 
 327 
If participants mainly explicitly learned abstract knowledge distinguishing 328 
transfer and different triplets, the I-E difference for transfer and deviant would be 329 
different. To test whether people expressed control over the acquired abstract 330 
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knowledge, an ANOVA with instruction (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of 331 
small-probability triplets (transfer vs. deviant) as the within-subject variables was 332 
used. It revealed an instruction effect, a type of small-probability triplet effect, and an 333 
instruction by type of small-probability triplet interaction (see Table 3). Further 334 
analysis revealed that participants generated more transfer under inclusion than 335 
exclusion (i.e., I > E), t (24) = 1.95, p = .063, dz = .39, B N (0, .10) = 3.90, but less 336 
deviant under inclusion than exclusion (i.e., I < E), t (24) = -7.47, p < .001, dz = 1.06, 337 
B N (0, .10) = 4.35×103. The different I-E pattern between transfer and deviant suggested 338 
that people treated transfer and deviant stimuli differently, i.e., they had control over 339 
the use of the knowledge of the abstract structures. 340 
 341 
----------- Insert Figure 3 about here----------- 342 
 343 
After each test trial, participants gave a confidence rating on a 50% to 100% 344 
scale. We calculated the regression coefficient of I-E difference against confidence 345 
ratings for deviant being reversals separately for each participant (Dienes & 346 
Longuet-Higgins, 2004; Fu, Dienes, & Fu, 2010), as participants expressed 347 
knowledge of concrete triplets and abstract structure when deviant triplets were 348 
reversals. Figure 3 shows mean I-E differences against confidence in Experiment 1. 349 
The I-E difference was below zero for deviant stimuli, t (21) = 3.70, p = .001, dz = .79, 350 
B N (0, .10) = 3.57, when participants gave 50% confidence, but there was no evidence 351 
for whether or not the I-E difference was different from chance for standard and 352 
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transfer stimuli, t (21) = -1.11, p = .28, B N (0, .10) = 1.27, t (21) = -1.17, p = .25, B N 353 
(0, .10) = 1.25, respectively. The slope was above zero for standard and transfer, t (21) = 354 
1.76, p = .09, B N (0, .89) = 3.30, t (21) = 2.05, p = .053, dz = .44, B N (0, .89) = 5.30, and 355 
was below zero for deviant, t (21) = -4.72, p < .001, dz = 1.01, B N (0, .89) = 9.14×103. 356 
The results indicated that the ability to control use of abstract knowledge was 357 
associated with awareness of knowing that knowledge.  358 
Discussion 359 
The RT results showed that participants responded faster to standard stimuli 360 
than to transfer stimuli and faster to transfer stimuli than to deviant stimuli, providing 361 
strong evidence that they simultaneous acquired knowledge about both concrete 362 
triplets and abstract structures. Moreover, there was only such a difference among the 363 
three types of stimuli when the deviant was a reversal triplet, indicating that the 364 
abstract structure people acquired was whether or not the stimulus was a reversal (cf 365 
Tanaka & Watanabe, 2013, 2014; also Li, Jiang, Guo, Yang, & Dienes, 2013, for 366 
implicit learning of reversals in artificial grammar learning). When the deviants were 367 
non-reversals, people responded more quickly to deviant than to standard or transfer 368 
stimuli, suggesting that rule learning about the abstract structure of whether being a 369 
reversal could overcome associative learning about the probability of occurrence for 370 
concrete triplets.  371 
Interestingly, although people were asked to generate more standard under the 372 
inclusion test and less transfer and deviant under the exclusion test, they generated 373 
more standard and transfer under inclusion than under exclusion, i.e., I > E for both 374 
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standard and transfer, and less deviant under inclusion than exclusion, i.e., I < E for 375 
deviant. The results indicated that people treated standard and transfer stimuli as 376 
similar, but transfer and deviant stimuli as different. Standard and transfer stimuli 377 
shared the same abstract structure and differed in the probability of occurrence, while 378 
transfer and deviant stimuli occurred with small probabilities but differed in abstract 379 
structure. The results revealed that the ability to control was mainly based on the 380 
abstract structure rather than the triplet as such. Moreover, confidence ratings 381 
indicated that only the ability to control the use of abstract knowledge was associated 382 
with the awareness of knowing. That is, at least some of the chunking knowledge was 383 
unconscious while the abstract knowledge was conscious in terms of knowing the 384 
legal status of each triplet. The findings leave open whether the abstract structure 385 
distinguishing deviants from transfer stimuli was itself known consciously, a point we 386 
return to in Experiment 3. 387 
Experiment 2 388 
Fu, Fu, and Dienes (2008) found that the amount of training influenced the 389 
conscious status of knowledge of concrete triplets and abstract structure: participants 390 
in the 6-block group acquired unconscious knowledge of abstract structure and 391 
concrete triplets, while participants in the 15-block group acquired conscious 392 
knowledge of concrete triplets and abstract structure. To further explore whether 393 
abstract knowledge can be implicitly acquired early in training, we reduced the 394 
training phase from twenty to five blocks in Experiment 2. 395 
Method  396 
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Participants 397 
Twenty-four undergraduate students (10 male, 14 female) took part in the 398 
experiment. None of them had previously taken part in any implicit learning 399 
experiment. They were paid for their attendance. 400 
Apparatus and Materials  401 
Apparatus and Materials were identical to Experiment 1. 402 
Procedure 403 
The procedure was same as Experiment 1 except that the training phase 404 
included only five training blocks for each group.  405 
Results 406 
Training data  407 
 408 
----------- Insert Figure 4 about here----------- 409 
 410 
Trials with RTs greater than 1,500 milliseconds were dropped; these amounted 411 
to 1.04% of the trials. Figure 4 shows the mean RTs obtained over the training phase 412 
in Experiment 2. To examine whether people can acquire chunking and abstract 413 
knowledge that distinguished standard from transfer and transfer from deviant 414 
separately, an ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli (standard vs. transfer vs. deviant) 415 
and blocks (5 levels) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed only a 416 
significant effect of type of stimuli (see Table 4). Participants responded more quickly 417 
to standard than to transfer, t (23) = 2.65, p < .05, dz = .54, B N (0, 20) = 18.76, and 418 
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responded more quickly to transfer than to deviant, t (23) = 9.21, p < .001, dz = 1.88, 419 
B N (0, 20) = 1.05×109, indicating two types of learning occurred at the same time.  420 
 421 
----------- Insert Table 4 about here----------- 422 
 423 
As in Experiment 1, we calculated RTs for each type of triplets when deviant 424 
were reversals or non-reversals. An ANOVA with type of stimuli (standard vs. transfer 425 
vs. deviant) and type of deviant (reversal vs. non-reversal) as within-subject variables 426 
revealed an effect of type of deviant, a significant effect of type of stimuli, and a 427 
significant type of stimuli by type of deviant interaction (see Table 4). When deviant 428 
were reversals, participants responded more quickly to standard than to transfer 429 
stimuli, t (23) = 3.51, p < .01, dz = .72, B N (0, 20) = 1.39×102, and responded more 430 
quickly to transfer than to deviant stimuli, t (23) = 10.62, p < .001, dz = 2.17, B N (0, 20) 431 
= 3.50×108. However, when deviant stimuli were non-reversal triplets, participants 432 
responded more quickly to deviant than to standard and transfer, t (23) = 3.19, p < .01, 433 
dz = .65, B N (0, 20) = 12.44, t (23) = 5.57, p < .001, dz = 1.14, B N (0, 20) = 1.21×102, 434 
respectively. The results confirmed that people could distinguish transfer from deviant 435 
because of the reversals. 436 
Overall, the mean error proportions for standard, transfer, and deviant were .06 437 
(SD = .03), .07 (SD = .04), and .12 (SD = .06). The error proportion for standard was 438 
lower than for transfer stimuli, t (23) = -1.76, p = .092, dz = .36, B N (0, .03) = 3.15, 439 
while the error proportion for transfer were lower than for deviant stimuli, t (24) = 440 
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-4.31, p < .001, dz = .88, B N (0, .03) = 4.01×102. The results indicated that the RT effects 441 
were not compromised by speed-error trade-offs. 442 
Test Data 443 
 444 
----------- Insert Table 5 about here ----------- 445 
 446 
Table 5 shows the mean proportion of triplets generated in Experiment 2. As in 447 
Experiment 1, we analyzed only the generation performance for deviant stimuli which 448 
were reversals. To investigate whether people expressed control over the acquired 449 
concrete knowledge, i.e., whether the I-E difference for standard and transfer were 450 
different, an ANOVA with instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of SOC 451 
triplets (standard vs. transfer) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed an 452 
instruction effect and an interaction of instruction by type of SOC triplets (see Table 453 
6). Further analysis revealed there were more standard than transfer under inclusion 454 
(i.e., I > B), t (23) = 2.36, p < .05, dz = .48, B N (0, .10) = 8.76, but there was no 455 
differences between standard and transfer under exclusion (i.e., E = B), t (24) = -.07, p 456 
= .95, B N (0, .10) = 0.27. Importantly, there was I > E for standard, t (23) = 3.01, p < .01, 457 
dz = .62, B N (0, .10) = 32.07, and for transfer, t (23) = 2.30, p < .05, dz = .47, B N (0, .10) = 458 
7.98. The I > E for transfer confirmed that people lacked control over the use of 459 
knowledge of the concrete triplets to some extent. 460 
 461 
----------- Insert Table 6 about here ----------- 462 
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 463 
To examine whether people expressed control over the acquired abstract 464 
knowledge, i.e., whether the I-E difference for transfer and deviant were different, a 465 
comparable ANOVA with instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of 466 
small-probability triplets (transfer vs. deviant) as within-subject variables was used. It 467 
revealed an effect of instruction, an effect of type of small-probability triplets, and an 468 
interaction of instruction by type of small-probability triplets (see Table 6). Further 469 
analysis revealed that there was I > E for transfer, t (23) = 2.30, p < .05, dz = .47, B N 470 
(0, 10) = 7.98, but I < E for deviant, t (23) = -2.98, p < .01, dz = .61, B N (0, .10) = 12.49. 471 
The different patterns for I-E differences between transfer and deviant confirmed that 472 
people had some ability to control the knowledge of abstract structures. 473 
 474 
----------- Insert Figure 5 about here----------- 475 
 476 
As in Experiment 1, we calculated regression coefficient of I-E difference 477 
against confidence ratings separately for each participant when deviant triplets were 478 
reversals. Figure 5 shows the mean generation difference between inclusion and 479 
exclusion against confidence ratings in Experiment 2. The I-E difference was below 480 
zero for standard stimuli when participants gave 50% confidence, t (19) = -2.45, p 481 
< .05, dz = .55, B N (0, .10) = 3.09, but there was no evidence for whether or not there 482 
was an I-E difference for transfer and deviant stimuli, t (19) = -.37, p = .72, B N (0, .10) = 483 
1.07, t (19) = 1.94, p = .067, B N (0, .10) = 1.74, respectively. The slope was above zero 484 
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for standard, t (19) = 3.16, p < .01, dz = .71, B N (0, .89) = 69.75, but there was no 485 
evidence for whether the slope was at or above zero for transfer, t (19) = -.04, p = .97, 486 
B N (0, .89) = 0.41. The slope was below zero for deviant stimuli, t (19) = -1.76, p = .094, 487 
dz = .43, B N (0, .89) = 3.28. That is, the ability to control the generation of standard and 488 
deviant stimuli was associated with the awareness of knowing the legal status of the 489 
stimulus. 490 
Discussion 491 
The training phase was reduced to five blocks in Experiment 2. The RT results 492 
showed that participants in both groups simultaneously acquired knowledge of both 493 
chunks and abstract structures, when the deviant stimuli were reversal triplets. 494 
Importantly, the test performance revealed that there was I > E for both standard and 495 
transfer stimuli, and I < E only for deviant stimuli, confirming that people had some 496 
ability to control the generation of triplets based on the abstract structure rather than 497 
the probability of occurrence. This is inconsistent with the findings of Fu et al. (2008) 498 
in which people expressed unconscious knowledge about abstract structure in the 499 
free-generation test when the training phase was short. A crucial difference between 500 
the free generation tests of Fu et al. and the trial-by-trial generation tests in this 501 
experiment is that participants can continuously produce those perhaps few triplets 502 
that come to their mind under free generation, while participants are tested on all 503 
triplets under trial-by-trial generation (Fu et al., 2010). As knowledge about abstract 504 
structures are embedded in all triplets while knowledge about concrete triplets are 505 
expressed by specific triplets, the trial-by-trial generation tests might be more 506 
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sensitive to the conscious status of abstract strictures than the free-generation tests. 507 
Moreover, the results of confidence ratings suggested that the ability to control use of 508 
abstract knowledge was at least partially associated with awareness of knowing the 509 
legal status of each triplet, even with a short training time. 510 
Experiment 3 511 
Dienes and Scott (2005) pointed out that there are two types of knowledge 512 
relevant in implicit learning research: judgment knowledge is knowledge of whether a 513 
particular stimulus is legal given the context, and structural knowledge is knowledge 514 
about the structure of the sequences in the training phase, and in principle may consist 515 
of knowledge of fragments, the whole sequence, of abstract patterns, conditional 516 
probabilities, and so on (see Rebuschat, 2013). Generation tests and confidence 517 
ratings measure the conscious status of judgment knowledge and not structural 518 
knowledge. Fu et al. (2010) found that conscious judgment knowledge can be based 519 
on unconscious structural knowledge in the SRT task. Thus, to investigate whether 520 
people can acquire unconscious structural knowledge about abstract structures with a 521 
short training phase, we adopted the same attribution tests in the trial-by-trial tests as 522 
used by Fu et al. (2010). For each triplet in the generation task, subjects indicated 523 
whether their judgment was a pure guess, based on intuition (they had confidence but 524 
no idea why their answer was right), or based on memory of that triplet or knowledge 525 
of a rule they could state. When performance was above chance, memory and rule 526 
attributions were taken to indicate that both judgment and structural knowledge were 527 
conscious; the intuition attribution that judgment knowledge was conscious but 528 
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structural knowledge unconscious; and the guess attribution that both judgment and 529 
structural knowledge were unconscious  530 
Method 531 
Participants 532 
Twenty-four undergraduate students (7 male, 17 female) took part in the 533 
experiment. None of them had previously taken part in any implicit learning 534 
experiment. They were paid for their attendance. 535 
Procedure 536 
Training phase. The training phase was same as Experiment 1 except that it 537 
included six training blocks for each group. 538 
Testing phase. The testing phase was similar to Experiment 1 with an exception 539 
that after each generation, participants were required to report the basis of their 540 
judgment by ticking one of: random or guess, intuition, rules or memory. Participants 541 
were provided with definitions taken from Dienes and Scott (2005). The guess 542 
attribution indicated that the judgment had no basis whatsoever, and it was equivalent 543 
to flipping a coin to arrive at the judgment. The intuition attribution indicated that the 544 
participant knew to some degree the judgment was right, but they had absolutely no 545 
idea why it was right. The rules or memory attribution indicated the participant felt 546 
they based their answer on some rule or rules acquired from the training phase and 547 
which they could state if asked or the person felt that the judgment was based on 548 
memory for particular items or parts of items from the training phase. To guarantee all 549 
subjects remembered the meanings of guess, intuition, rules and memory, the 550 
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definitions were presented on each trial. 551 
Inferential strategy 552 
For the proportion of each attribution in the inclusion and exclusion test, with 553 
three choices the average proportion was .33, so we report BN (0, .33). 554 
Results 555 
Training data  556 
 557 
----------- Insert Figure 6 about here----------- 558 
 559 
Trials with RTs greater than 1,500 milliseconds were dropped; these amounted 560 
to 0.93% of the trials. Figure 6 shows mean RTs obtained over the training phase in 561 
Experiment 3. To examine whether people can acquire chunking and abstract 562 
knowledge that distinguished standard from transfer and transfer from deviant at the 563 
same time, an ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli (standard vs. transfer vs. deviant) 564 
and blocks (6 levels) as within-subject variables was used (see Table 7). It revealed 565 
only a significant effect of type of stimuli. Participants responded more quickly to 566 
standard than to transfer stimuli, t (23) = 4.70, p < .001, dz = .96, B N (0, 20) = 2.24×104, 567 
and more quickly to transfer than to deviant stimuli, t (23) = 7.14, p < .001, dz = 1.46, 568 
B N (0, 20) = 8.55×106, confirming the two types of learning occurred simultaneously.  569 
 570 
----------- Insert Table 7 about here ----------- 571 
 572 
 29 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, we calculated RTs for each type of triplet when 573 
deviants were reversals or non-reversals. An ANOVA with type of stimuli (standard vs. 574 
transfer vs. deviant) and type of deviant (reversal vs. non-reversal) as within-subject 575 
variables revealed an effect of type of stimuli, a significant effect of type of deviant, 576 
and a significant type of stimuli by type of deviant interaction (see Table 7). Further 577 
analysis revealed that when deviants were reversals, participants responded more 578 
quickly to standard than to transfer stimuli, t (23) = 3.39, p < .01, dz = .69, B N (0, 20) = 579 
1.43×102, and more quickly to transfer than to deviant stimuli, t (23) = 7.14, p < .001, 580 
dz = 1.46, B N (0, 20) = 8.96×107. However, when deviants were non-reversals, all 581 
participants responded more quickly to deviant than to standard or transfer stimuli, t 582 
(23) = 8.43, p < .001, dz = 1.72, B N (0, 20) = 1.65×105, t (23) = 5.96, p < .001, dz = 1.22, 583 
B N (0, 20) = 88.95, respectively. This confirmed that the abstract structure people 584 
acquired was the property of being a reversal. 585 
Overall, the mean error proportions for standard, transfer, and deviant stimuli 586 
were.06 (SD = .05), .07 (SD = .04), and .12 (SD = .08). There was no evidence one 587 
way or the other for a difference in error proportions between standard and transfer 588 
stimuli, t (23) = -1.26, p = .22, dz = .26, B N (0, .03) = 1.30, but there was evidence that 589 
the the error proportion for transfer was lower than for deviant stimuli, t (23) = -3.56, 590 
p < .01, dz = .73, B N (0, .03) = 46.64. The results suggested that the RT effects were not 591 
compromised by speed-error trade-offs. 592 
Test Data 593 
 594 
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----------- Insert Table 8 about here ----------- 595 
 596 
Table 8 shows the mean proportions of triplet generated in Experiment 3. As in 597 
Experiments 1 and 2, we analyzed only the generation performance for deviants when 598 
they were reversals. To examine whether people expressed control over the acquired 599 
chunking knowledge, i.e., whether the I-E difference for standard and transfer were 600 
different, an ANOVA with instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of SOC 601 
triplets (standard vs. transfer) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed an 602 
instruction effect, a type of SOC triplets effect, and an interaction of instruction by 603 
type of SOC triplets (see Table 9). Further analysis revealed that there were more 604 
standard than transfer under inclusion (i.e., I > B), t (23) = 3.40, p < .01, dz = .69, B N 605 
(0, .10) = 1.51×102, but there was no differences between standard and transfer under 606 
exclusion (i.e., E = B), t (24) = .04, p = .97, B N (0, .10) = 0.31. Importantly, there was 607 
I > E for standard, t (23) = 4.86, p < .001, dz = .81, B N (0, .10) = 8.29×103, and there 608 
was no evidence one way or the other for the I-E difference for transfer, t (23) = 1.52, 609 
p = .14, B N (0, .10) = 2.19. That is, people lacked control over the concrete triplets to 610 
some extent. 611 
 612 
----------- Insert Table 9 about here ----------- 613 
 614 
To test whether people expressed control over the acquired abstract knowledge, 615 
i.e., whether the I-E difference for transfer and deviant were different, a comparable 616 
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ANOVA with instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) and type of low probability triplets 617 
(transfer vs. deviant) as within-subject variables was used. It revealed an effect of 618 
instruction, an effect of type of low probability triplets, and an interaction of 619 
instruction by type of low probability triplets (see Table 9). Further analysis revealed 620 
that there was no evidence one way or the other for the I-E difference for transfer, t 621 
(47) = 1.52, p = .14, B N (0, .10) = 2.19, but there was evidence that I < E for deviant 622 
stimuli, t (23) = 3.76, p = .001, dz = .77, B N (0, .10) = 69.71. The results indicated that 623 
people could express some control over abstract structure. 624 
 625 
----------- Insert Figure 7 about here----------- 626 
 627 
Figure 7 shows proportion and accuracy of each attribution in Experiment 3. An 628 
ANOVA on proportions with attributions (guess vs. intuition vs. rules or memory) and 629 
instructions (inclusion vs. exclusion) as within-subject variables revealed a significant 630 
attribution effect, F (1.40, 32.14) = 27.46, p < .001, ŋp2 = .54, which was qualified by 631 
a significant attribution by instruction interaction, F (1.30, 29.90) = 13.17, p < .001, 632 
ŋp2 = .36. Further analysis revealed that there were less guess attributions during 633 
inclusion than exclusion, t (23) = -3.76, p = .001, dz = .77, B N (0, .33) = 4.82×102, but 634 
more intuition attributions during inclusion than exclusion, t (23) = 4.86, p < .001, dz 635 
= .99, B N (0, .33) = 2.37×104, and no evidence one way or the other for the difference in 636 
rules or memory attribution between inclusion and exclusion, t (23) = 1.52, p = .14, B 637 
N (0, .33) = .69, respectively.   638 
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Guess attributions indicate that the participant is unaware of both judgment and 639 
structural knowledge; intuition attributions indicate that the participant is aware of 640 
judgment knowledge but not structural knowledge; and rules and memory indicate the 641 
participants were aware of both judgment and structural knowledge (Dienes & Scott, 642 
2005; Fu et al., 2010). To examine the conscious status of the acquired structural 643 
knowledge, we calculate the I-E difference for each type of triplet when people gave 644 
guess, intuition, and rules or memory attributions. The one-sample t tests revealed that 645 
when people gave guess attribution, there was no evidence one way or the other for an 646 
I-E difference for standard or transfer stimuli, t (18) = .98, p = .34, B N (0, .10) = 1.44, t 647 
(18) = .44, p = .66, B N (0, .10) = 0.97, but there was evidence for I < E for deviant 648 
stimuli, t (18) = -2.14, p < .05, dz = .48, B N (0, .10) = 5.42. When people gave intuition 649 
attributions, there was evidence for I > E for standard stimuli, t (20) = 1.78, p = .091, 650 
dz = .39, B N (0, .10) = 3.38, and no evidence for whether or not there was an I-E 651 
difference for transfer stimuli, t (20) = .89, p = .38, B N (0, .10) = 1.33, and evidence for I 652 
< E for deviant stimuli, t (20) = -2.98, p < .01, dz = .65, B N (0, .10) = 19.65. When 653 
people gave a rules or memory attribution, there was insensitive evidence for I-E 654 
differences for standard, transfer, or deviant, t (15) = 1.94, p = .072, B N (0, .10) = 2.93, t 655 
(15) =.00, p = 1.00, B N (0, .10) = .79, t (15) = -1.87, p = .081, B N (0, .10) = 2.79. The 656 
results provide evidence that the ability to control can be based on unconscious 657 
structural knowledge. 658 
Discussion 659 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the RT results suggested that participants acquired 660 
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knowledge about both concrete triplets and abstract structures when the deviant 661 
stimuli were reversal triplets, and the generation performance confirmed that the 662 
ability to control was mainly based on the abstract structure rather than knowledge of 663 
chunks. Importantly, we found that the ability to control was expressed when people 664 
gave guess and intuition attributions, suggesting that people acquired unconscious 665 
structural knowledge about abstract structures with a short training phase. 666 
General discussion 667 
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether people can implicitly 668 
acquire abstract structures rather than just memorized chunks in the SRT. To 669 
dissociate abstract or rule learning from associative learning, we adopted three types 670 
of stimuli in the training phase, in which standard and transfer shared the same 671 
abstract structure but differed in the probability of occurrence, while transfer and 672 
deviant stimuli occurred with the same low probabilities but differed in abstract 673 
structure. To measure the conscious status of the acquired knowledge, we adopted 674 
both ability to control as revealed by the PDP method, and awareness of knowing as 675 
revealed by the subjective measures as the key methods. The RT results showed that 676 
only when deviants were reversals did people respond more quickly to standard than 677 
to transfer, and more quickly to transfer than to deviant. People simultaneously 678 
acquired knowledge of chunks and the abstract structure of being a reversal. The 679 
generation performance showed that I > E for both standard and transfer stimuli but I 680 
< E for deviant stimuli; that is, the ability to control generation was mainly based on 681 
knowledge of abstract structures rather than concrete triplets. Moreover, generation 682 
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performance for each attribution in Experiment 3 indicated that when the training 683 
phase was short the ability to control generation of abstract structures could be based 684 
on unconscious structural knowledge. 685 
Can people acquire abstract knowledge in implicit sequence learning?      686 
Although Goschke and Bolte (2007) found that people could implicitly acquire 687 
knowledge about abstract sequence structures in implicit sequence learning, other 688 
researchers have argued that abstract knowledge can be acquired only in explicit 689 
learning conditions (Boyer et al., 2005; Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, 2005; Shanks & 690 
St John, 1994). On this view, implicit sequence learning is associatively based rather 691 
than rule based (see Speiegel & McLaren, 2006). Of course, devices based on 692 
principles of association can have rules emerge in their representations (Dienes, 1992); 693 
they can become graded finite state devices (Cleeremans, 1993) or, if 694 
representationally rich enough, even graded supra-finite state devices (Rodriguez, 695 
Wiles, & Elman, 1999). Nonetheless, models based purely on chunking would have 696 
difficulties accounting for differences between transfer and deviant stimuli in the 697 
training and test phase in our experiments. The RT results in the three experiments 698 
showed that all participants responded faster to standard than to transfer and faster to 699 
transfer than to deviant stimuli regardless of the amount of training in all three 700 
experiments, indicating that people acquired knowledge about concrete chunks and, 701 
above and beyond chunks, about abstract structures. Importantly, the RTs were faster 702 
to standard than to transfer and faster to transfer than to deviant stimuli only when the 703 
deviants were reversals, suggesting that the abstract structure was being a reversal, as 704 
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in ABA grammars (Marcus, 1999) or n-2 repetition structures (Koch, Philipp, & Gade, 705 
2006). Forming associations between colours, or forming simply chunks of colours, 706 
would not allow this learning. An associative device that uses hidden units to capture 707 
abstract structure, then uses variable mappings onto this abstract structure in order to 708 
transfer the relations between different colours, could in principle learn (Altmann & 709 
Dienes, 1999; Dienes, Altmann, & Gao, 1999).    710 
Whether the sort of network used by Dienes et al (1999) could simulate the 711 
results is an open question. Such a network would find chunks easier than abstract 712 
structure. Yet, we found that people expressed knowledge about abstract structures in 713 
the early training phase. Consistently, Pronk and Visser (2010) found that people 714 
responded faster to non-reversals than to reversals early in training in the one-reversal 715 
condition, indicating an early learning effect of the abstract structure. This might be 716 
partially because the abstract structure, an n-2 dependency, is a relatively easy 717 
repetition pattern. Moreover, there was significant interaction of type of stimuli by 718 
block in Experiments 1, indicating that the abstract learning effect was larger later 719 
than early on. While pure chunking models are ruled out, as well as associative 720 
models with colours as inputs and without hidden layers, further work is needed to 721 
discover which models of implicit learning could account for the present results.  722 
Moreover, as the color sequence corresponded to the motor sequence in the 723 
present study, the acquired knowledge could be learned via either perceptual or motor 724 
sequence learning. Future work is needed to explore whether people can acquire 725 
abstract structures through pure perceptual or motor sequence learning. 726 
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Can the degree of abstraction determine the conscious status of knowledge?    727 
We found that people generated more standard and transfer triplets under 728 
inclusion than exclusion (I > E) but less deviant triplets under inclusion than 729 
exclusion (I < E), regardless of the amount of training. As standard and transfer 730 
triplets had the same abstract structure but differed in the probability of occurrence 731 
(.83 vs. .083), while transfer and deviant triplets shared the same low probability of 732 
occurrences but differed in the abstract structure (reversal vs. non-reversal), the results 733 
revealed that people had control over the use of knowledge of the abstract structure 734 
but lacked control over the use of knowledge of concrete triplets in the sense that they 735 
inaccurately represented transfer triplets as high frequency. However, in some 736 
previous studies (e.g., Wilkinson & Shanks, 2004), the results that people generated 737 
more standard triplets under inclusion than exclusion (i.e., I > E for standard) and 738 
similar levels of standard under exclusion as baseline (i.e., E = B under exclusion), 739 
had been taken to suggest that people can express control over the use of knowledge 740 
of concrete triplets. Indeed, we also found I > E for standard and E = B under 741 
exclusion in most of conditions even when we analyzed only test trials when deviants 742 
were reversals. But, more importantly, our results further revealed that there was also 743 
I > E for transfer but I < E for deviant, suggesting that people treated standard and 744 
transfer triplets similarly but transfer and deviant triplets differently. That is, their 745 
ability to control was mainly based on abstract structures rather than concrete triplets.  746 
Control over accepting a test triplet may plausibly go with knowing that one 747 
knows the triplet is legal or not. The relation between control and awareness of 748 
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knowing is not necessary; one could have the experience of guessing and still exert 749 
control (e.g. Norman, Scott, Price, & Dienes, 2016). Still, control and awareness of 750 
knowing tend to go together, and consistently we found that confidence ratings 751 
predicted control (Experiments 1 and 2). Both confidence ratings and control assess 752 
awareness of “judgment knowledge”, i.e. the knowledge that an item is legal (Dienes, 753 
2012). The judgment that a triplet was legal or not, when its legality was defined by 754 
being a reversal, appears to be conscious. However, the most interesting type of 755 
implicit knowledge may be structural knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of structural 756 
relations that enabled the judgment. Just because the judgment knowledge of reversals 757 
was conscious, that does not mean subjects knew that it was being a reversal that 758 
made the triplet legal. That is, structural knowledge can be unconscious when 759 
judgment knowledge is conscious. Experiment 3 explored the conscious status of both 760 
judgment and structural knowledge and found evidence for unconscious judgment 761 
knowledge of each of chunks and abstract structure, co-existing with conscious 762 
judgment knowledge of each. Importantly, there was unconscious structural 763 
knowledge of each.  764 
To sum up, the current study demonstrated that people can simultaneously 765 
acquire knowledge about concrete chunks or abstract structures in implicit sequence 766 
learning. Moreover, our result also revealed that the ability to control was mainly 767 
based on knowledge of abstract structures rather than knowledge of chunks, which 768 
was not generally accompanied with the awareness of knowing measured by 769 
confidence and attribution tests. The results confirmed that people can acquire 770 
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unconscious knowledge about abstract structures which presents a challenge to 771 
computational models and theories of implicit learning.   772 
 39 
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Table 1. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli and blocks or 926 
type of stimuli type of deviants as within-subject variables in Experiment 1. 927 
 Type of stimuli * Blocks  Type of stimuli * Type of deviants 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Type of stimuli 144.50*** .86  9.69*** .29 
Blocks/Type of 
deviants 
2.52* .10  9.27*** .28 
Two-way interaction 1.79* .07  76.42*** .76 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 928 
< .01; ***p < .001. 929 
930 
 48 
 931 
Table 2. Mean proportion of three types of triplets generated under inclusion and 932 
exclusion tests in Experiment 1. 933 
 Reversals-deviant  Non-reversals-deviant 
Standard Transfer Deviant Standard Transfer Deviant 
Inclusion .52 (.01) .37 (.01) .11 (.01)  .33 (.07) .38 (.05) .29 (.05) 
Exclusion .29 (.03) .32 (.02) .39 (.05)  .26 (.06) .24 (.05) .51 (.07) 
934 
 49 
 935 
Table 3. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with instructions and type of SOC 936 
triplets or type of small-probability triplets as the within-subject variables in 937 
Experiment 1. 938 
 Type of stimuli * Type of 
SOC triplets 
 Type of stimuli * Type of 
small-probability triplets 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Type of stimuli 35.57*** .60  47.24*** .66 
Blocks/Type of 
deviants 
26.02*** .52  5.60* .19 
Two-way interaction 22.23*** .35  23.37*** .49 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 939 
< .01; ***p < .001. 940 
941 
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 942 
Table 4. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli and blocks or 943 
type of deviants as within-subject variables in Experiment 2. 944 
 Type of stimuli * Blocks  Type of stimuli * Type of deviants 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Type of stimuli 64.60*** .74 6.81* .23 
Blocks/Type of 
deviants 
  5.00* .18 
Two-way interaction   51.23*** .69 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 945 
< .01; ***p < .001. 946 
947 
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 948 
Table 5. Mean proportion of three types of triplets generated under inclusion and 949 
exclusion tests in Experiment 2. 950 
 Reversals-deviant  Non-reversals-deviant 
Standard Transfer Deviant Standard Transfer Deviant 
Inclusion .46 (.02) .41 (.02) .13 (.03)  .16 (.04) .35 (.05) .49 (.06)  
Exclusion .35 (.03) .35 (.03) .30 (.06)  .24 (.07) .45 (.07) .31 (.06)  
951 
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 952 
Table 6. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with instructions and type of SOC 953 
triplets or type of small-probability triplets as the within-subject variables in 954 
Experiment 2. 955 
 Instructions * Type of 
SOC triplets 
 Instructions * Type of 
small-probability triplets 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Instructions 8.86** .28  9.08*** .28 
Blocks/Type of 
deviants 
4.12* .15  9.98** .30 
Two-way interaction    8.13** .26 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 956 
< .01; ***p < .001. 957 
958 
 53 
 959 
Table 7. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with type of stimuli and blocks or 960 
type of deviants as within-subject variables in Experiment 3. 961 
 Type of stimuli * Blocks  Type of stimuli * Type of deviants 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Type of stimuli 73.45*** .76 8.80** .23 
Blocks/Type of 
deviants 
  3.61* .14 
Two-way interaction   55.86*** .71 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 962 
< .01; ***p < .001. 963 
 964 
965 
 54 
Table 8. Mean proportion of three types of triplets generated under inclusion and 966 
exclusion tests in Experiment 3. 967 
 Reversals-deviant  Non-reversals-deviant 
Standard Transfer Deviant Standard Transfer Deviant 
Inclusion .49 (.01) .40 (.01) .11 (.01)  .19 (.06) .41 (.07) 40 (.06) 
Exclusion .36 (.03) .35 (.03) .29 (.05)  .26 (.07) .32 (.06) .42 (.07) 
 968 
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 970 
Table 9. Significant results of the ANOVA on RTs with instructions and type of SOC 971 
triplets or type of small-probability triplets as the within-subject variables in 972 
Experiment 3. 973 
 Instructions * Type of 
SOC triplets 
 Instructions * Type of 
small-probability triplets 
F  ŋp 2 F  ŋp 2 
Instructions 14.12*** .38  23.56*** .56 
Type of SOC triplets 
/ type of small- 
probability tripets  
5.65* .20  25.24*** .52 
Two-way interaction 7.07* .24  9.02** .28 
Note: In each ANOVA, we report F values with significance and ŋp 2. * p < .05;  **p 974 
< .01; ***p < .001. 975 
976 
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Figure captions 977 
  978 
Figure 1. A) The exemplars of the probabilistic sequences in the training phase, in 979 
which numerals 1, 2, 3, and 4 corresponded to red, yellow, blue, and green colour 980 
squares, respectively; B) Trial by trial frame of the procedure in the test phase; C) 981 
Trial by trial frame of the procedure in the test phase. 982 
 983 
Figure 2. Mean RTs in Experiment 1. Error bars depict standard errors. 984 
 985 
Figure 3. Mean differences between inclusion and exclusion of standard, transfer, and 986 
deviant generated in the test phase for each confidence rating in Experiment 1. Error 987 
bars depict standard errors. 988 
 989 
Figure 4. Mean RTs in Experiment 2. Error bars depict standard errors. 990 
 991 
Figure 5. Mean differences between inclusion and exclusion of standard, transfer, and 992 
deviant generated in the test phase for each confidence rating in Experiment 2. Error 993 
bars depict standard errors. 994 
 995 
Figure 6. Mean RTs in Experiment 3. Error bars depict standard errors. 996 
 997 
Figure 7. Proportions for different attributions and I-E differences for different type of 998 
 57 
triplets generated in Experiment 3. Error bars depict standard errors. 999 
